In November 2024, the General Services Administration (GSA) Office of Inspector General (OIG), Office of Inspections, initiated an inspection of indoor firing ranges (ranges) located within GSA-owned buildings. The objective of this inspection was to determine if the Public Buildings Service (PBS) is complying with agency policies and federal regulations for the maintenance and safety of ranges located within GSA-owned buildings.
PBS supports approximately 30 ranges within GSA-owned buildings across the 11 GSA regions. These ranges are training facilities designed specifically for small arms ammunition weapons qualifications using both live-fire ammunition and non-lethal ammunition (i.e., tasers or rubber bullets). Ranges within GSA-owned buildings are exclusively used by law enforcement agencies for the purpose of training, firearms qualifications, proficiency testing, and certification.
This report contains our finding from conducting interviews, reviewing documentation, and making observations during site visits to the following judgmental sample of buildings (see Appendix A for site selection process):
- Edward A. Garmatz U.S. District Courthouse, Baltimore, Maryland (Garmatz Courthouse)
- U.S. Bankruptcy Courthouse, Tallahassee, Florida (Bankruptcy Courthouse)
- Sandra Day O’Connor U.S. Courthouse, Phoenix, Arizona (O’Connor Courthouse)
- Oroville Land Port of Entry, Oroville, Washington (Oroville LPOE)
- William Jefferson Clinton Federal Building, Washington, D.C. (Clinton Building)
Our inspection found that PBS did not provide effective oversight of the operations and maintenance of these ranges. We found that the range at the Oroville LPOE is operating in an unsafe manner. We discovered that the range’s target retrieval system was broken, which is a violation of the GSA PBS Indoor Firing Range Design and Operations Criteria (Range Criteria). The broken target retrieval system affects the range’s safety and operational efficiency, and PBS has so far failed to address the unsafe conditions.
During our site visits, we identified instances of noncompliance with the Range Criteria at all five ranges, such as a lack of documentation that inspections and cleanings were performed by qualified personnel experienced in range design and operations. We also observed inconsistencies with the interpretation of the range program requirements and confusion as to who has the ultimate responsibility to carry out the required biennial range inspections. This confusion specifically caused building operations personnel at the Clinton Building to claim that GSA delegated the range operations and maintenance to the tenant agency; however, Clinton Building personnel were unable to provide any documentary evidence to support that claim.
Our report makes two recommendations to address the issues identified during the inspection. In response to our report, GSA management agreed with our recommendations. Management comments can be found in their entirety in Appendix B.
REPORT
