



Office of Audits  
Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration

# GSA Is Not Consistently Addressing Deficient Security Fixtures at GSA-Controlled Facilities

Report Number A240039/P/5/R26004  
March 24, 2026

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## Executive Summary

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### GSA Is Not Consistently Addressing Deficient Security Fixtures at GSA-Controlled Facilities

Report Number A240039/P/5/R26004

March 24, 2026

#### Why We Performed This Audit

We performed this audit because of long-standing concerns over security vulnerabilities at GSA-controlled facilities, which include government-owned and leased office buildings, courthouses, land ports of entry, and warehouses. GSA has a responsibility to protect these facilities, working with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Federal Protective Service (FPS).

Our audit objectives were to determine if GSA: (1) took actions to resolve or mitigate security fixture vulnerabilities identified in facility security assessments and (2) installed physical access control systems (PACS) that grant access to employees and contractors by electronically authenticating personal identity verification credentials at all active entry points in GSA-controlled facilities.

#### What We Found

The Interagency Security Committee's *Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard* (RMP) establishes a single, formalized process for specifying the standards and guidelines to follow when determining federal facility security requirements. The RMP countermeasures outline the actions facilities must take to reduce the risk of a wide range of security threats unless a deviation is justified. Additionally, the RMP requires federal tenants to fund any approved countermeasures. In accordance with a 2023 memorandum of agreement between GSA and FPS, GSA is responsible for the installation, maintenance, and repair of security fixtures, such as [REDACTED].<sup>1</sup>

However, GSA is not consistently addressing deficient security fixtures at GSA-controlled facilities, leaving the facilities and occupants at risk from security threats. We found [REDACTED]. We also found that at some facilities, [REDACTED] and that, in some cases, [REDACTED]. These deficiencies occurred because: (1) GSA staff were not consistently fulfilling their facility security responsibilities, (2) [REDACTED], and (3) funding constraints prevented the installation and upkeep of security fixtures.

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<sup>1</sup> Redactions in this report represent sensitive information related to federal building security.

## What We Recommend

We recommend the GSA Administrator:

1. Enforce internal procedures to ensure that the Office of Mission Assurance and Office of Facilities Management perform their required facility security responsibilities.
2. In conjunction with FPS:
  - a. Conduct a nationwide assessment of outstanding deficient security fixtures.
  - b. Develop and implement a plan to repair, replace, or install security fixtures identified through the nationwide assessment.
  - c. .
  - d. If GSA cannot secure funding to repair, replace, or install security fixtures, work with the Office of Management and Budget to establish a consistent funding stream to address current and future security fixture deficiencies.

GSA agreed with our report recommendations. GSA's response can be found in its entirety in ***Appendix D***.

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## **Introduction**

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We performed an audit of physical security vulnerabilities at GSA-controlled facilities across five GSA regions.

### **Purpose**

We included this audit on our *Fiscal Year 2024 Audit Plan* because of long-standing concerns over security vulnerabilities at GSA-controlled facilities.

### **Objectives**

Our audit objectives were to determine if GSA: (1) took actions to resolve or mitigate security fixture vulnerabilities identified in facility security assessments and (2) installed physical access control systems (PACS) that grant access to employees and contractors by electronically authenticating personal identity verification (PIV) credentials at all active entry points in GSA-controlled facilities.

See **Appendix A** – Objectives, Scope, and Methodology for additional details.

### **Background**

GSA is the federal government's primary real property and asset management agency. In conjunction with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) Federal Protective Service (FPS), GSA has a responsibility to protect GSA-controlled facilities, which include government-owned and leased office buildings, courthouses, land ports of entry, and warehouses. The security of these facilities affects not only the daily operations of the federal government, but also the health, well-being, and safety of federal employees and the public.

### **GSA-Controlled Facility Security Roles and Responsibilities**

The responsibilities for the security of GSA-controlled facilities primarily lie with GSA's Office of Mission Assurance (OMA) and the GSA Public Buildings Service's (PBS's) Office of Facilities Management (OFM).

**OMA responsibilities.** OMA is responsible for the physical security of GSA-controlled facilities. Through a partnership with FPS, OMA implements policies, procedures, and operations within GSA's emergency management, continuity, and security program areas. OMA's mission is to integrate security, continuity, and readiness expertise within GSA and with critical stakeholders.

**OFM responsibilities.** OFM provides facilities-related solutions and services to federal tenants located in workspaces across the nation. OFM’s mission is to provide safe, reliable, productive, and sustainable workplace environments that support the business of the federal government at the best value to the taxpayer.

### Relevant Laws and Guidance for Security Fixtures at GSA-Controlled Facilities

**Homeland Security Act  
of 2002  
(November 25, 2002)**

Expressly affirms the GSA Administrator’s authority to operate, maintain, and protect federal facilities. The act does not “restrict the authority of the Administrator of General Services to promulgate regulations affecting property under the Administrator’s custody and control.”

**Office of Management  
and Budget (OMB)  
Memorandum M-05-24,  
*Implementation of  
Homeland Security  
Presidential Directive  
(HSPD) 12 – Policy for a  
Common Identification  
Standard for Federal  
Employees and  
Contractors*  
(August 5, 2005)**

Requires the development and agency implementation of a mandatory, government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms of identification for federal employees. Among other requirements, the memorandum orders that secure and reliable forms of identification be rapidly authenticated electronically.

**OMB Memorandum  
M-19-17: *Enabling  
Mission Delivery through  
Improved Identity,  
Credential, and Access  
Management*  
(May 21, 2019)**

Sets forth the federal government’s *Identity, Credential, and Access Management* policy. This memorandum requires agencies to use the PIV credential for physical access to federal facilities and secured areas in accordance with *The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard*.

**The National Institute of Standards and Technology's Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 201-3 (FIPS 201-3), *Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors* (January 2022)**

Establishes a standard for a PIV system that meets the control and security objectives of HSPD-12. It is incorporated by reference in OMB Memorandum M-19-17. Among other requirements, FIPS 201-3 stresses that visual authentication of a PIV card should not be used as a stand-alone authentication mechanism, because it “provides little or no assurance of the cardholder’s identity.”

***The Risk Management Process for Federal Facilities: An Interagency Security Committee Standard (RMP)* (November 2021)**

Establishes the Interagency Security Committee (ISC) as a committee of federal agencies working to enhance the security and protection of federal facilities. This standard includes RMP Appendix B, *Countermeasures* (RMP countermeasures), which helps federal agencies determine how to mitigate risks to federal facilities. This standard also describes the requirements, roles, and uses of a:

- Facility Security Committee (FSC) and
- Facility Security Assessment (FSA).

An FSC consists of federal tenant agencies responsible for: (1) addressing security issues and (2) approving and funding the implementation of security measures at each facility. FSC completes the FSA, which documents an evaluation of a federal facility’s security-related risks.

**2023 GSA-FPS  
Memorandum of  
Agreement  
(2023 MOA)  
(April 27, 2023)**

Outlines GSA’s responsibility for installation, maintenance, and repair of security fixtures approved and funded by the FSC. Security fixtures are either: (1) part of the facility or (2) attached and not easily removable from the facility, such as:



The 2023 MOA further states that the GSA Administrator retains “all powers, functions, and authorities ... that are necessary for the operation, maintenance, and protection of such buildings and grounds.”

**OMA 1000.3, CHGE 1,  
*Responsibilities for  
Implementation of  
Facility Security  
Assessment  
Countermeasures*  
(January 18, 2018)**

Changes the responsibilities of PBS and OMA in relation to the use of FSA information in the implementation of FSC countermeasure decisions in GSA-controlled facilities. OMA 1000.3 requires PBS and OMA to coordinate with the FSC chairperson, attend FSC meetings, and provide technical guidance on FSA countermeasures.

**GSA Order ADM  
5900.1A, *Physical Access  
Control Systems (PACS)  
in U.S. General Services  
Administration  
Controlled Space*  
(September 30, 2024)**

Established an Agency-wide approach and policy to update, procure, and install compliant PACS in GSA-controlled spaces. The order requires GSA to procure, install, or update existing noncompliant PACS components or systems with PACS that are compliant with HSPD-12, GSA IT, and GSA network policies.

## Specific Security Fixtures

The ISC RMP countermeasures require the presence of physical security countermeasures at GSA-controlled facilities.<sup>2</sup> Per the 2023 MOA, GSA is responsible for the installation, maintenance, and repair of security fixtures, such as [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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<sup>2</sup> Physical security countermeasures are actions, measures, or devices intended to reduce an identified risk, threat, or danger.

<sup>3</sup> OMB Memorandum M-05-24, *Implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 – Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors*; and OMB Memorandum M-19-17, *Enabling Mission Delivery through Improved Identity, Credential, and Access Management*.

## Prior GSA Office of Inspector General Reports

Since Fiscal Year 2020, we have issued the following five reports identifying physical security deficiencies in GSA-controlled facilities:

- In January 2020, we reported on security vulnerabilities in child care centers in GSA-controlled facilities.<sup>4</sup> We found that [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] child care centers in GSA-controlled facilities in our sample [REDACTED].
- In September 2021, we issued a report identifying significant problems with the [REDACTED].<sup>5</sup>
- In June 2022, we reported on the security vulnerabilities of security cameras and alarm systems in GSA-controlled facilities across three GSA regions.<sup>6</sup> We found that the security camera and alarm systems in the [REDACTED] GSA-controlled facilities we visited were [REDACTED].
- In September 2024, we reported that PBS had not effectively addressed the recommendations included in the January 2020 child care center report.<sup>7</sup> As a result, [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] of the [REDACTED] child care centers in GSA-controlled buildings.
- In October 2024, we reported that GSA had not implemented all required facility security controls at a high-risk GSA facility.<sup>8</sup> We found [REDACTED].

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<sup>4</sup> *Child Care Centers in GSA-Controlled Buildings Have Significant Security Vulnerabilities* (Report Number A170119/P/6/R20001, January 30, 2020).

<sup>5</sup> *Unrestricted Summary: Facility Inspection of a High-Risk GSA Building* (Report Number JE21-003, September 30, 2021).

<sup>6</sup> *Audit of Security Camera and Alarm Systems at GSA-Owned Buildings* (Report Number A210033/P/5/R22006, June 22, 2022).

<sup>7</sup> *Implementation Review of Corrective Action Plan: Child Care Centers in GSA-Controlled Buildings Have Significant Security Vulnerabilities, Report Number A170119/P/6/R20001, January 30, 2020* (Assignment Number A240019, September 17, 2024).

<sup>8</sup> *Unrestricted Summary: Facility Security Inspection of a High-Risk GSA Building* (Report Number JE25-001, October 16, 2024).

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## Results

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**Finding – GSA is not consistently addressing deficient security fixtures at GSA-controlled facilities and, as a result, is leaving the public, employees, and property at risk from security threats.**

The ISC RMP establishes a single, formalized process for specifying the standards and guidelines to follow when determining federal facility security requirements. The RMP countermeasures outline the actions facilities must take to reduce the risk of a wide range of security threats unless a deviation is justified. Additionally, the RMP requires federal tenants to fund any approved countermeasures. In accordance with the 2023 MOA between GSA and FPS, GSA is responsible for the installation, maintenance, and repair of security fixtures, such as [REDACTED].

However, GSA is not consistently addressing deficient security fixtures at GSA-controlled facilities, leaving the facilities and occupants at risk from security threats. We found deficiencies in [REDACTED]. We also found that at some facilities, [REDACTED] and that, in some cases, [REDACTED]. These deficiencies occurred because: (1) GSA staff were not consistently fulfilling their facility security responsibilities, (2) [REDACTED], and (3) funding constraints prevented the installation and upkeep of security fixtures.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

<sup>9</sup>

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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<sup>9</sup> See **Appendix B** for a complete listing of [REDACTED] for each building in our sample.

[Redacted]

12

[Redacted]

<sup>12</sup> OMB M-05-24, OMB M-19-17, ISC RMP countermeasures, and GSA Order ADM 5900.1A.

[Redacted]

13

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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<sup>13</sup> OMB M-19-17 incorporates the FIPS 201-3, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

### Causes of Security Fixture Deficiencies

The deficiencies identified above are attributable to three causes: (1) GSA staff were not consistently fulfilling their facility security responsibilities, (2) [REDACTED], and (3) funding constraints prevented the installation and upkeep of security fixtures.

**GSA staff were not consistently fulfilling their facility security responsibilities.** OFM and OMA staff were not consistently performing their required facility security responsibilities. These responsibilities are specified in GSA Order OMA 1000.3, *Responsibilities for Implementation of Facility Security Assessment Countermeasures*. The order requires OFM and OMA to: (1) review FSAs, (2) attend FSC meetings, and (3) monitor and track countermeasures recommended in FSA reports.

However, we found that some OFM facility managers were not aware of their responsibility to review FSAs and did not know the unique circumstances of their respective facilities. For example, when discussing GSA’s physical security responsibilities, the facility manager for the [REDACTED] told us that “GSA never manages security in buildings.” In another example, the facility manager for the [REDACTED] told us that the security at his facility was delegated to the largest tenant.<sup>15</sup> However, GSA records do not identify the [REDACTED] as delegated, and OFM confirmed that the facility is not delegated. The [REDACTED] facility manager was also unable to answer most of our security-related questions, despite managing the facility for more than 3 years.

Additionally, the OMA Chief Security Officer told us that: (1) OMA staff were not receiving invitations to FSC meetings and (2) his staff only met with facility managers when requested.

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<sup>15</sup> Delegated facilities refer to the authority granted to agencies from GSA to operate and manage buildings, including physical security responsibilities, and perform repair and alteration projects.

Finally, OFM and OMA staff were not consistently monitoring and tracking countermeasures recommended in FSA reports. The OFM Director of Facilities Operations told us that OFM relies on OMA to monitor and track countermeasures. However, the OMA Chief Security Officer told us that OMA would need to be invited to meetings to monitor and track countermeasures and FSC decisions. As the technical resource for OFM, it is critical for OMA to review all FSAs and attend all FSC meetings to ensure that FSCs have a clear understanding of the recommended countermeasures and risks. However, OFM must also fulfil its responsibilities under GSA Order OMA 1000.3 to ensure proper coordination with the FSC.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

**Funding constraints prevented the installation and upkeep of security fixtures.** The OFM Director of Facilities Operations and OMA Chief Security Officer stated that funding is the biggest constraint preventing the installation and upkeep of security fixtures. GSA and tenant agencies have a joint responsibility for funding security fixtures; however, sufficient funding is not always available. As a result, GSA and tenant agencies are often unable to fund all recommended security fixture needs, thereby accepting the risks arising from the deficient fixtures.

In accordance with the RMP, GSA and tenant agencies comprise a building's FSC. The RMP states that the FSC is responsible for: (1) reviewing the security countermeasures recommended by FPS's security assessments and (2) voting on which countermeasures to fund. As discussed in this report, we consistently found that deficiencies in security fixtures occurred because the FSCs voted against providing the necessary funding to address the deficiencies.

For example, the facility manager for the [REDACTED], told us that FSCs are not willing to accept a rent increase to fund these security countermeasures.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, the FSC for the [REDACTED], rejected the installation of [REDACTED] because of costs, with the facility manager for the building noting that "agencies very rarely vote to fund" these costs.<sup>18</sup>

While some security fixtures are exclusively funded by GSA, the OFM Director of Facilities Operations told us that this occurs on a limited basis. For example, GSA is responsible for installing and bearing the cost of [REDACTED]. However, even when GSA is solely responsible for these costs, it is often confronted with competing priorities for the funding. For example, as previously discussed, the facility manager for the [REDACTED], stated that projects for security fixtures often lose out to projects needed to address safety or emergency repairs.<sup>19</sup>

In sum, security fixtures at GSA-controlled facilities are deficient. Accordingly, GSA should address these deficiencies to protect its facilities and tenants.

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<sup>17</sup> See pages 8-9.

<sup>18</sup> See page 9.

<sup>19</sup> See pages 7-8.

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## Conclusion

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GSA is not consistently addressing deficient security fixtures at GSA-controlled facilities, leaving the facilities and occupants at risk from security threats. We found deficiencies in [REDACTED]. We also found that at some facilities [REDACTED] and that in some cases, [REDACTED]. These deficiencies occurred because: (1) GSA staff were not consistently fulfilling their facility security responsibilities, (2) [REDACTED], and (3) funding constraints prevented the installation and upkeep of security fixtures.

Taken together, the examples above demonstrate that GSA needs to address the deficiencies in the security fixtures to protect its facilities and tenants. To do so, GSA should enforce internal procedures to ensure that its staff performs their required facility responsibilities.

GSA should also coordinate with FPS to conduct a nationwide assessment so that it has a current, accurate, and complete inventory of all security fixture deficiencies. GSA should develop and implement a plan to repair, replace, or install security fixtures. [REDACTED]

Lastly, while GSA is responsible for security fixtures under its MOA with FPS, it faces challenges to fund the costs of the fixtures, especially when the FSCs do not vote to fund them. We recognize that GSA must carefully manage its available budgetary resources to fund these costs, as well as those necessary to maintain and operate its real property portfolio. These competing priorities may limit GSA's ability to fully fund the security fixtures needed to protect its facilities and tenants. Accordingly, if GSA determines that funding is not available, GSA, in conjunction with FPS, should work with OMB to establish a consistent funding stream to address security fixture deficiencies.

## Recommendations

We recommend the GSA Administrator:

1. Enforce internal procedures to ensure that OMA and OFM perform their required facility security responsibilities.
2. In conjunction with FPS:
  - a. Conduct a nationwide assessment of outstanding deficient security fixtures.

- b. Develop and implement a plan to repair, replace, or install security fixtures identified through the nationwide assessment.
- c. [REDACTED]
- d. If GSA cannot secure funding to repair, replace, or install security fixtures, work with OMB to establish a consistent funding stream to address current and future security fixture deficiencies.

### **GSA Comments**

GSA agreed with our report recommendations. GSA's response can be found in its entirety in ***Appendix D***.

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## Appendix A – Objectives, Scope, and Methodology

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### Objectives

We performed this audit because of long-standing concerns over security vulnerabilities at GSA-controlled facilities. Our audit objectives were to determine if GSA: (1) took actions to resolve or mitigate security fixture vulnerabilities identified in FSAs and (2) installed PACS that grant access to employees and contractors by electronically authenticating PIV credentials at all active entry points in GSA-controlled facilities.

### Scope and Methodology

Our audit covered security vulnerabilities recorded on the last two FSAs and the installation of PACS for each building visited. We visited a total of [REDACTED] GSA-controlled facilities across [REDACTED] GSA regions. We conducted our survey and fieldwork site visits between March and October 2024.

To accomplish our objectives, we:

- Researched and reviewed documentation, regulations, and standards specific to security countermeasures;
- Selected a judgmental sample of [REDACTED] GSA-controlled facilities;
- Interviewed OMA, PBS, and FPS officials about vulnerabilities listed in the FSAs' internal physical security processes, such as chain of command, reporting processes, and funding mechanisms;
- Visited all [REDACTED] GSA-controlled facilities in our sample and observed what, if any, security countermeasures were present; and
- Analyzed prior GSA Office of Inspector General audit reports, inspection reports, and corrective actions significant to the audit objectives.

### Sampling

We selected a judgmental sample of [REDACTED] out of 8,621 GSA-controlled facilities from five metropolitan areas: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We considered the following when selecting the sample facilities:

- Cities with dense populations of GSA-controlled facilities;
- Proximity to and between building locations to limit travel;
- Presence of a child care center (at least one in each city/region);

- Facilities categorized at Facility Security Level 4;<sup>20</sup>
- Multi-tenant facilities; and
- No stand-alone courthouses.

While our judgmental sample does not allow for projection of the results to all GSA-controlled facilities, it did allow us to adequately address our audit objectives.

### **Internal Controls**

We assessed internal controls significant within the context of our audit objectives against GAO-14-704G, *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*. The methodology above describes the scope of our assessment and the report finding includes any internal control deficiencies we identified. Our assessment is not intended to provide assurance on GSA's internal control structure as a whole. GSA management is responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls.

### **Compliance Statement**

We conducted the audit between February 2024 and September 2025 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our finding and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our finding and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

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
<sup>20</sup> A Facility Security Level is a categorization based on the analysis of several security-related facility factors. The Facility Security Level serves as the basis for the identification of preliminary countermeasures and reoccurring risk assessments. Facility Security Levels range from 1 (low risk level) to 5 (highest risk level).

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**Appendix B –** [REDACTED]

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This appendix illustrates [REDACTED] that we observed during our site visits at each facility. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED].





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
**Appendix C –** [REDACTED]


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This appendix illustrates [REDACTED] that we observed during our site visits at each facility. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]





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## Appendix D – GSA Comments

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**U.S. General Services  
Administration**

February 25, 2026

**MEMORANDUM FOR**      MICHAEL LAMONICA  
   REGIONAL INSPECTOR GENERAL  
   GREAT LAKES REGION  
   OFFICE OF AUDITS  
   OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL (JA-5)

**FROM:**                      ANDREW HELLER                      *Andrew Heller*  
   ACTING COMMISSIONER  
   PUBLIC BUILDINGS SERVICE (P)

   ROBERT J. CARTER                      *Robert Carter*  
   ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR  
   OFFICE OF MISSION ASSURANCE (D)

**SUBJECT:**                      Response to the Office of Inspector General Draft  
   Report, *GSA Is Not Consistently Addressing Deficient  
   Security Fixtures at GSA-Controlled Facilities (A240039)*

The Office of Mission Assurance (OMA) and the Public Buildings Service (PBS) appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the subject draft report, in which the Office of Inspector General made the following recommendations:

1. Enforce internal procedures to ensure that OMA and the PBS Office of Facilities Management perform their required facility security responsibilities.
2. In conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security-Federal Protective Service (FPS):
  - a. Conduct a nationwide assessment of outstanding deficient security fixtures.
  - b. Develop and implement a plan to repair, replace or install security fixtures identified through the nationwide assessment.
  - c. Recommendation redacted in accordance with the redacted report.
  - d. If GSA cannot secure funding to repair, replace or install security fixtures, work with the Office of Management and Budget to establish a consistent funding stream to address current and future security fixture deficiencies.

OMA and PBS agree with both recommendations.

**U.S. General Services Administration**  
1800 F Street NW  
Washington, DC 20405  
[www.gsa.gov](http://www.gsa.gov)

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Please contact Pat Fee, Facilities Operations Director, PBS Office of Facilities Management - Programs and Services Division, at [patrick.fee@gsa.gov](mailto:patrick.fee@gsa.gov) with any questions regarding this response.

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## ***Appendix E – Report Distribution***

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GSA Administrator (A)

GSA Deputy Administrator (AD)

Acting Commissioner (P)

Deputy Commissioner (P1)

Acting Chief of Staff (P2)

Deputy Commissioner of Enterprise Strategy (P2)

Acting Chief of Staff (PB)

Associate Administrator, Office of Mission Assurance (D)

Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Mission Assurance (D1)

Chief of Staff, Office of Mission Assurance (D2)

Chief Financial Officer (B)

Acting Deputy Chief Financial Officer (B)

Office of Audit Management and Accountability (BA)

Assistant Inspector General for Auditing (JA)

Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Acquisition Audits (JA)

Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Real Property Audits (JA)

Director (JAO)



## CONTACT US

For more information about the GSA OIG, please visit us online at [www.gsaig.gov](http://www.gsaig.gov).

**Office of Inspector General  
U.S. General Services Administration**

1800 F Street, NW

Washington, DC 20405

Email: [oig\\_publicaffairs@gsaig.gov](mailto:oig_publicaffairs@gsaig.gov)

Phone: (202) 501-0450 (General)

(202) 273-7320 (Press Inquiries)

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